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ABSTRACT
This purpose of this study was to address the following
questions:
. How do developers make decisions about what gets built once a
basic product type and market location have been chosen?
. How might these processes be, at worst, remedied, or at best,
enhanced?
. Given that real estate literatures ignore the topic of
product development, how applicable is a product development
process model from the consumer and industrial goods sectors
in regard to the formation of the real estate "product"?
To answer these questions, many literatures on product development
were studied and a framework of recurrent themes was synthesized
from them. A single product type and a market context were chosen
(condominiums in Toronto). Two product developers and two
marketing consultants were interviewed, and the resulting cases
were analyzed comparatively according to the product development
framework.
This study found that the product development paradigm from the
consumer and industrial goods and services sectors is applicable
to the study of Toronto condominiums. Given the prior selection
of a basic product type and market location, developers' product
decision-making processes are part art, part science. Having
market data is not necessarily a competitive advantage, but having
in place an informed product development process and an internal
mechanism for dealing with it is. While having no methodology at
all could be disadvantageous for the RED firm in a downturn
market, having a process that is too institutionalized could also
be problematic.
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The study concluded that the real estate development industry
needs to become more marketing-driven in its approach to product
development, and that firms can start to build learning bases by
utilizing the experience and insights of marketing consultants.
Thesis supervisor: Gloria Schuck
Title: Lecturer, Sloan School of Management
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INTRODUCTION
"There is only one valid definition of business purpose: to
create a customer... Because its purpose is to create a
customer, the business enterprise has two - and only these
two - basic functions: marketing and innovation..."
-Peter Drucker 1
"The process is very simple: we start with the envelope,
which dictates the constraints. We go to an architect, and
ask him to give us some ideas... His ideas come forward,
and then we pick and choose [among them]. Our process is
based on gut feel and not on the dictates of marketing."
-condominium developer
"We often find that developers think they have the greatest
taste, and that their wives [sic] make the best interior
decorators. This can make for a marketing disaster. As a
developer, you really have to put your taste on the back
burner. Your taste doesn't matter.. .the buyer's does."
-condominium marketing consultant
When not preoccupied with deal structuring, restructuring,
or the political challenges of getting land rezoned, the real
estate development (RED) industry concentrates on creating
what it calls "product", including but not limited to office
buildings, parking garages, shopping malls, and housing. A
myriad of textbooks, academic papers and courses abound for the
study of financial methods in real estate, and much attention has
been paid to the political concerns of the developer, but
virtually no attention has been paid' to the product development
process. How do developers make decisions about what gets built
once a basic product type and market location have been chosen?
What informs their processes? And how might these processes be
remedied at worst, or enhanced at best?
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Although the product development process has been little-
studied with regard to real estate, a wealth of information
exists on its counterparts in the consumer and industrial goods
and services sectors. If a systematic method of development can
be applied to a consumer good like a toaster oven, a conceptually
similar method should be applicable for the design and marketing
of an office or residential condominium building.
The aim of this research is to study product development and
management frameworks from the consumer/industrial sectors and
their application to the real estate business. The scope of this
study is quite broadly based on a theoretical level, but becomes
site-specific through the introduction of case studies, which
hone in on a particular product (condominiums) in a particular
market (Toronto). What marketing and organizational
decision-making strategies were used at companies to arrive at a
"product"?
The paper is divided into four parts:
1. A PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK
In the first section of the paper, a general framework for
product development and management strategies is presented.
Steps and considerations in the product design decision process
are outlined, as are the ingredients of a thorough development
policy. At the end of this section, the discussion of product
strategy begins to focus specifically on the real estate
7
industry, through a series of questions.
2. CASE STUDIES
The purpose of the case studies is to place and study the
product development framework in a real estate context. The case
studies focus on a specific product type (condominiums) in a
specific market (Toronto). This chapter presents the results of
interviews with decision-makers at two RED firms and two
marketing consulting organizations regarding their approach to
real estate product development. The cases are prefaced by a
brief history of Metro Toronto condominium development and
current market conditions, and also by a rationale for the
selection of interviewees.
3. ANALYSIS
Each pair of interviews (two developers or two marketing
consultants) is followed by a comparative analysis, and then a
third analysis is made, comparing and contrasting the points of
views of developers and marketers.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter the author shares the conclusions of this
research.
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ONE. THE PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK
"There is only one valid definition of business purpose: to
create a customer... Because its purpose is to create a
customer, the business enterprise has two - and only these
two - basic functions: marketing and innovation..." 2
What creates a customer for a business? A product, a
fabrication that fulfills the needs or wants of the purchaser.
And what creates a product? An individual or company. And why
is that product created? For any number of reasons, including
the company's wish to earn profits, increase its competitive
position, keep pace with technology, respond to demographic and
lifestyle changes, or respond to pre-existing demand. "Products
are means of solving problems for both buyers and sellers -
bundles of expectations for both..." 3
Among the many products introduced by firms into the North
American marketplace every year, failures are commonplace.
Although "there are no reliable overall statistics on new product
successes or failures" since these labels are relative to a
company's goals, marketing consultants Booz, Allen and Hamilton
estimate that "35 percent of products introduced into the market
fail." 4'S
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Reasons for product failure can include:
-selecting a market that is too small for the product
-failing to innovate or differentiate
-poorly positioning the product
-misunderstanding consumer needs
-forecasting errors in demand
-not anticipating a strong competitive response
-not anticipating changes in consumers' tastes
-yielding a product which is poorly matched to the company's
attributes
-organizational problems (or "pathologies") 6
As with 'failure', product 'success' is relative to
corporate goals. However, quite simply, "[products] succeed
because customers find them superior, cheaper or distinctive." 7
A MARKETING/PRODUCT MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY:
The notion exists that a disciplined approach for business
is necessary to manage the process of product development, to
avert failure and to help ensure success.
"The task of product management is to find out what makes a
product superior, cheaper, or distinctive from a particular
segment of users. Once identified, such "winning features"
can be built into new products and into the marketing
programs supporting such products." 8
Literatures suggest that methodologies of new product
development nest within a larger corporate philosophy on
marketing. 9 Marketing is viewed as "an integral part of
organizational strategy" and "the primary means by which the
organization links itself with the external environment". 10,11
Its philosophies espouse the the necessity of "setting goals,
establishing policies and programs, and implementing business
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action for the entire firm." 12 Marketing strategy must span the
time period from "the inception of a new product idea to the
decision to terminate an old [one]... to achieve.. .product goals
rather than let circumstances dictate the[ir] fate." 13
In theory and practice, marketing "focuses on the business
as a satisfier of consumer wants and needs." 14 Ideally, there
should be a comfortable match between a company's capabilities
and goals, and a customer's wants and needs, actual and
potential.
"True marketing starts out the way Sears starts out - with
the customer, his demographics, his realities, his needs,
his values. It does not ask, "What do we want to sell?" It
asks, "What does the customer want to buy?" It does not say,
"this is what our product or service does." It says, "These
are the satisfactions the customer looks for, values and
needs." " 15
When a company is production oriented, it takes stock of its
manufacturing capabilities, makes products, aggressively tries to
sell them, and "aim[s] at [the] customer as a target." 16 In
distinction, a marketing oriented company starts by examining
"actual and potential customer wants and needs", looks at market
opportunities, assesses and improves its manufacturing
capabilities, strategizes on a mix of product, price and
promotion, and only then engages itself in selling to a
pre-targetted customer. 17
Another fundamental precept of marketing is that change is a
constant:
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"In accepting change as a constant, marketing management
recognizes that customers and consumers change; markets
change continuously; and the products and services, the
marketing methods, and even the very nature of a company
must change to meet them." 18
Marketing literatures suggest that such precepts and
policies are totally ineffective if a firm lacks a suitable
organizational design to carry them out. Product development
should be dealt with on either a functional, customer or product
basis. 1 9 For example, General Electric might have approached the
product development process for the toaster oven by way of a
product development department (functional basis), residential
consumer department (customer basis), or through a small
appliance division (product basis).
"While there is no single organizational approach to
assembling and coordinating the marketing function in a
given enterprise, it is essential that a top level executive
be responsible for the firm's marketing management
activities.. .The key consideration is that the various
functions associated with the marketing mix should be
grouped together in an organizational design that
facilitates the development of an integrated marketing
strategy for serving the firm's target markets." 20
A MULTIPLICITY OF MODELS AND VIEWS:
As many models seem to exist on product development methods
as there are textbooks written on the subject. The diverse
models all agree on the precept that clear strategy, mobilization
and discipline are needed to guide the product development
process, rather than a laissez-faire or disorganized stance.
They also all acknowledge that actual methods are unique to
particular products. From recurrent general themes, a hybrid
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model is presented in this research.
This hybrid model suggests that, before a product is
introduced into the marketplace, there are three basic steps in
its development: organizing (strategy development); design of the
marketing mix; and testing. (Product introduction will not be
elaborated on in this research).
(A) ORGANIZING FOR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
1. defining corporate mission or objectives
2. assuming a proactive or reactive stance
3. analyzing the market and market opposition
4. zooming in on a target
5. formulating specific marketing objectives and overall
strategy
(B) DESIGN OF MARKETING MIX
1. product design
2. pricing
3. promotion
(C) PRODUCT TESTING
(A) ORGANIZING FOR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
1. DEFINITION OF CORPORATE MISSION AND OBJECTIVES
"Effective new-product development requires clearly stated
corporate objectives." 21 At the outset of the product
development process, a company must have a clear idea of itself,
its goals, and (most importantly) its resources and limitations.
Establishing this self-knowledge will not only help to guide the
firm through the process, but will also help to provide a
bench-mark for after-the-fact evaluations.
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"New product development should reflect the overall policy
and strategy of the organization... [perhaps beginning]
with an audit of the company's capabilities and its
environment. What are we good at? Where are we vulnerable?
Why have we succeeded in the past? Where are our major
products in their life cycles? ... What business are we in,
and what are our goals?" 22
2. ASSUMPTION OF A PROACTIVE OR REACTIVE STANCE
Once a company sets its goals and performance measures, one
of its most basic strategic decisions is whether to be reactive
or proactive. A reactive strategy deals with impinging forces as
they occur and may be either:
-defensive, in which a firm makes "changes in existing
products" as a response to a competitor's new product;
-imitative, also known as the "me-too" approach;
-"second-but-better", "[in which] case the firm waits unitl
the competitor's product is revealed and then not only
copies it but improves on it"; or
-responsive, ie. "purposely reacting to consumers'
requests". 23
Proactive strategies "explicitly allocate resources to
preempt undesirable future events and achieve goals" 24 and tend
to initiate change through:
-research and development programs;
-entrepreneurial visions (taking "an idea and making it
'happen' by building venture enthusiasm and generating
resources"); or
-marketing approaches which "find a consumer need and ...
[build] a product to fill it." 25
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Competing companies are either followers or leaders in
product development. Leaders assume a proactive stance,
followers a reactive one:
"Product strategies may be a reaction to a competitor's
moves and consist of adjustment of current product lines, or
they may involve the development of new products... Some
companies develop the reputation of being the first to
research and develop a particular idea and bring it to
market. They establish themselves as product and industry
leaders. Others tend to a policy of followership -
innovative imitation. They are neither in a position nor
choose to risk the resources on the development of new ideas
and new market segments. They wait for the acceptance of a
new product idea before developing and marketing a similar
product themselves. This strategy of followership is often
used by small firms, but not necessarily only by them." 26
In some instances, a pre-established brand or product line
leaves a very limited scope of development to its manager. For
example,
"[t]he product can be reformulated, but only within fairly
narrow limits... The price can be manipulated, again with
narrow limits. (Changes are usually forced rather than
voluntary.)... The pack's structure and design can be
altered quite significantly, but any such change has to
preserve the brand's identity and suit its reputation and
standing." 27
3. ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET AND MARKET OPPOSITION
28The following chart summarizes the concerns of product
developers within their operative market and competitive
environments:
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GENERAL CHARACTERISTIC CONCERN
POTENTIAL -SIZE OF MARKET
-SALES GROWTH RATE
PENETRATION -VULNERABILITY OF COMPETITORS
SCALE -SHARE OF MARKET
-CUMULATIVE SALES VALUE
INPUT -INVESTMENT IN DOLLARS
AND TECHNOLOGY
REWARD -PROFITS
RISK -STABILITY
-PROBABILITY OF LOSSES
In analysis, the tools of the trade are many, and managers
use concepts from a variety of disciplines, including
quantitative, social and behavioral sciences to solve marketing
problems." Firms may compile or purchase demographic studies and
regression analyses for the macro- or micro- markets; they may
also collect ear-to-the-ground information. In every instance,
it is a merely a technique of the firm to collect data, but an
art to translate that data into something more meaningful.
The competition should be studied to evaluate its
vulnerabilities:
"...[C]ompetitive monitoring is usually limited to
developing a picture of what competitors have done or are
doing, as reported in trade and business periodicals, in
syndicated research reports, or through field personnel.
More often than not, this kind of intelligence focuses on
pricing and promotional tactics... any deeper analysis tends
to be product-line parochial, which obscures a competitor's
total business strengths and vulnerabilities." 29
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4. ZOOMING IN ON A TARGET
'Targeting' involves aiming all marketing strategies and the
marketing mix (product, price, promotion) at a particular group
of customers, like a dart at a board. As one of the most
critical steps in the product development process, failure to
define an appropriate target or any clear target at all could
easily lead to product failure. Decisions on target choice are
best informed by an analysis of the market and competition, and
through a strong attempt by the company to match itself to its
customers. Single or multiple targets may be chosen, and
convergent or divergent strategies chosen for them:
"1 ... Converging strategy refers to the convergence of
demand for product variety among individual market segments,
so that distinct markets are satisfied by a single or
limited offering... Divergent product policies adjust
product lines to individual market segments..." 30
5. FORMULATION OF SPECIFIC MARKETING OBJECTIVES
AND OVERALL STRATEGY
"The importance of setting specific marketing objectives is
so fundamental to marketing strategy design that it should
be an obvious first step in the process. Yet in practice,
there is a surprising number of firms that fail to formulate
and quantify marketing objectives." 31
Specific objectives to be established include
"profitability, sales volume, market share, product insulation,
and time requirements." 32 Profitability may be measured in terms
of any of the following: specific absolute-profit target;
gross-margin figure; return-on-investment (ROI); and/or return on
stockholders' equity. 33 Market share tells a company how its
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product is doing relative to its competition's. Lastly, product
insulation may be desired.
"Product insulation means that a product or service has
secured a protected niche in the market such that it is
relatively immune to the marketing tactics of competition...
[achieved generally] through the strategy of differential
advantage." 34
In addition, a company needs to:
(1) assess costs of product development and marketing;
(2) create a schedule for the product development process:
"Too long a... process can result in lost opportunities,
while too short a process can ignore key issues and result
in failure... The usual time for developing, testing and
introducing new products is probably longer than most people
would think: two and one-half years for consumer products
... [and] five years for industrial products..." 35
(3) assess market risks and create contingency plans:
"The strategy-oriented process has one additional element
not present in traditional marketing, and that is
contingency planning. In developing marketing plans founded
on assumptions regarding future trends, it is important to
have an escape hatch if one or more key variables start to
veer off course."
"A sensitivity analysis of key variables and the development
of "What if.. ." scenarios with trigger points and action
plans will help to maintain a strategic compass heading and
to elevate the comfort level of management... Any other
approach to the future...could result in aimless wandering
down unproductive side roads and blind alleys, in inverted
priorities, in a misuse of marketing resources... To meet
consumer... needs, to outflank competition, to leverage the
competences of the business, and to meet management's
expectations, the marketing plan.. .must have the appropriate
strategic elements up front." 36
and (4) seek to position a proposed product in the marketplace,
since a product is not only a physical entity but also a
"psychological positioning." 37 Marketing literatures define
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this "as matching a set of product attributes or benefits to a
segment of the category market." 38
(B) DESIGN OF THE MARKETING MIX
Ideally, in the first phase of product development, a firm
defines its corporate mission or objectives, assumes a proactive
or reactive stance, analyzes the market and market opposition,
finds an appropriate target, and formulates specific marketing
objectives and an overall strategy. The marketing mix, a
package of product, price, and promotional strategy, logically
flows from the aforementioned steps, and is subject to testing
and iteration.
1. PRODUCT DESIGN
Product design has as its parameters and takes its cues from
market studies (to determine specific product needs and
opportunities), competitive analysis, target group analysis, and
the specific marketing objectives and already-formulated overall
strategy (product positioning, profile and differentiation).
Ideally, design is based on the prospective buyer profile. Ideas
may be "evolutionary" or "revolutionary", 3 9 and may be generated
within the firm, by outside consultants, or "with members of the
general public." 40
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The design process itself is "interactive... [and] not
accomplished in one step", but iterative in nature: 41
"The process of design itself is seen by Mintzberg,
Raisinghani, and Theoret (1976) to follow certain
regularities depending on whether it is a custom-made
solution or a modification of already available
alternatives. The designers begin creating the custom-made
solution with a vague image of some ideal one. They pursue
a sequence of nested design and search cycles, working their
way through a decision tree. The decisions at each
successive node became more narrow and focused. Failure at
any node leads to cycling back to an earlier node. A
solution takes shape as the designers move along developing
their solution without really knowing what it will look like
until it is completed." 42
In considering their competition, "[c]ompanies are faced
with a drive to innovate because the outcome provides a
differential advantage." 43 Successful innovations "must be based
on the familiar" , and are often instigated by marketing
executives. Innovation's strongest enemy is inertia:
"Resistance to innovation may be external or
internal...[externally coming] from customers and
competitors as they react in the marketplace... [and
internally] from the enterprise itself. Companies
emphasizing standard operating procedures, routines, rules,
budgetary limitations, and conformity place a damper on
creativeness. Executives may resist innovations when they
feel that innovations will limit their own progress and
development." 44
2. PRICING
Components of perceived value are: cost to produce; ability
to obtain a certain price from the marketplace; and aesthetic
value.
"Of all the decisions leading up to the introduction of a
new product, setting the price is usually the most difficult
and causes the most impact - although it often seems an
obvious decision. Pricing affects demands, investment
20
levels, and ultimately profits. It is difficult because we
have only the vaguest idea of demand for the product, let
alone demand at various price levels. Further, researching
price is, at best, a controversial idea (will people really
buy a product at a specified price when they say they
will?)." 45
Price may be determined on a cost-plus basis, or as a
function of demand. Demand pricing "focuses on the product and
its market", 46 and may take the form of price skimming or
penetration:
"If you have the only product in the market, you have an
interesting choice. You can price the product high
initially, and skim the cream off the top of the market
(really the top segment) before you lower it to be
attractive to other segments. Of course, this takes time.
If you fear a quick entry by a competitor, you may prefer a
penetration strategy. This involves setting a lower price,
and thereby capturing a large piece of the market before
your competitor(s) arrives." 47
3. PROMOTION
Promotion should be designed to attract the attention of
target markets, and as a complement to a product and its pricing.
It embraces public relations, graphic design and advertising.
(C) PRODUCT TESTING
"Many companies launch new products.. .without test
marketing, product testing, concept research or any of 'that
kind of nonsense', because they are sure they cannot fail...
Some companies place a great reliance on test marketing for
predictive purposes. Some do not believe test marketing is
worth the time or the dangers of competitors learning about
new products and possibly beating them to...launch." 48
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Three sound reasons for testing the product before launching
it are prediction, investment protection (risk related), and
learning from mistakes. 9 The overall objective of test
marketing is to test the acceptability and the receptibility of a
product and its price by consumers. Specifically, a company will
attempt to further define the psychological profiles of its
target group; determine consumer satisfaction in the product; get
an idea of appropriate pricing; and find out about competitors'
comparable products.
Methods of gathering this information include the release of
a product to a small testing area along with follow-up
questionnaires or interviews, or the creation of focus groups.
The focus group interviewing technique:
"is similar to brainstorming except that the participants
are potential customers. Respondents are led in a
discussion of a product category for which they are
potential users... out of the session[s come] several
important new product ideas." 50
The three part model (organizing for product development,
design of the marketing mix, and product testing) outlines
critical product development process steps. To translate these
theoretical steps into practice is difficult; "[the] process is
important, but ...[making] it real requires managerial discipline
and control..." 51 It must be noted that the product development
process is neither so linear nor so systematic that it can be
characterized as a science.
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"No process for developing new products is foolproof, and
though various elements in the process can be systematized,
new product development is still as much an art as a
science." 52
Even though much of the product development process is
quantifiable and subject to regression or numerical sensitivity
analysis...
"marketing people provide another important input to
managerial judgment that must not be lost... That knowledge
is knowledge that is almost intuitive of the nuances of the
marketplace - a knowledge that cannot be reduced to a
quantifiable state and analyzed - plus an understanding of
the real people who comprise the segments and how they might
react to change. These strong visceral impulses are based
on experience and learned perceptions, and they are the
ground on which the marketing structure is built." 53
Lastly, there is no one-size-fits-all process:
"There is probably no single solution to any problem in the
field of marketing, though some lend themselves to fairly
precise optimization, and there is certainly no way of
developing new products - just as there is no single style
of management. The problems, and therefore the solutions,
will always be unique to the combination of market, company
and personnel for which they occur." 54
Many questions arise regarding the applicability of the
three step "toaster oven" model to the real estate product. Can
real estate firms define their corporate missions or objectives
in the same way that consumer product firms might? Do producers
of penthouses analyze the market and opposition, choose their
targets, formulate specific marketing strategies, develop
marketing mixes, and test their products in much the same way as
producers of canned peas? Chapter Two applies the product
development framework to real estate.
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TWO. THE PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO A SITE
To answer to the questions posed in this thesis on the
applicability of the product development framework to real
estate, a single product type and a market context were chosen
(condominiums in Toronto) for study. Two product developers and
two marketing consultants were interviewed. Finally, the cases
resulting from the interviews were analyzed comparatively
according to the product development framework.
24
SITE SELECTION CRITERIA
This research examined aspects of the real estate product
development process by focusing on a specific product type -
condominiums - in a particular market - Toronto. Locating the
cases in single market climate, and considering only one product
type, enabled potentially differing philosophies to be compared
and contrasted in a meaningful way. Also, since condominiums
were relatively new to Toronto as a product type, it was
interesting to study the forces that shaped them. The single
disadvantage of studying only one specific product type and
market was that the generality of the findings might be limited.
It was surmised that influence in the decision-making
process came from two groups, developers and condominium
marketing consultants. Therefore, representatives of both groups
were contacted, and senior managers or principals of two RED
firms and two marketing consultancies were interviewed in person.
Each interview lasted between sixty and ninety minutes, and was
presented to the same general protocol (see Appendix A).
In the site selection process for RED companies, seven
likely "candidates" were approached. Four of these firms had no
internal mechanism for dealing with the issue of product
development (ie., no definable person or team responsible for
issues of marketing and design). In the fifth instance, it was
against the firm's corporate policy to divulge its product
25
development process. The remaining two firms employed managers
who were responsible for design and marketing issues. They spoke
openly about their work, experiences, and ideas.
The RED companies interviewed had been active in
developing condominiums in Toronto within the last five years.
Although these firms were of differing sizes, structures and
norms, both created projects of a similar scale, and catered to
similar market segments. In each case, condominiums were not the
only product type handled by the firm.
The two marketing consultancies interviewed differed in
focus: one concentrated on product image, and the other
specialized in process management for condominium product
development. Both were renowned within the Toronto market for
expertise in their respective areas.
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THE CONDOMINIUM PRODUCT IN THE TORONTO MARKET
"Land in and around Toronto is at a premium, and single
family homes are not only becoming unaffordable for some
people, they've become just plain unavailable, especially in
the downtown core..." No longer do people [in Toronto] think
exclusively in terms of a single-family house with a white
picket fence. For now, it's the case that, whether it be a
first home, a retirement home, or something bought for the
years in between, most Toronto residents will end up owning
at least one condomimium during their lifetimes." 1
Twenty five years ago, "there wasn't a single condominium in
[Canada] ... in those days, you either rented or you owned a
house." 2 Condos, or "individually owned apartments", 3 appeared
in Canada in 1966, when the Ontario government first permitted
apartment conversion. They got a boost in the late '60s, when
the federal government saw them as a way to increase property
ownership, and created programs enabling people to buy units with
$99 down-payments. A number of developers began to produce new
condominium buildings to keep pace with demand, especially in
cities like Toronto. These developments, which looked exactly
like rental apartment buildings, began to suffer a cruel turn
when thousands of owners suddenly defaulted on their mortgages.
"[F]aced with unexpected costs [of ownership]... they walked away
from their units... because they had so little equity tied up." 4
It is with this shaky beginning that the condominium product
type established itself in Toronto, and with it, developers who
are still active today. One of them, Summit * 5, has produced
about 14,000 condominium units in Toronto since 1970, mostly in
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the suburbs.
The banks' fear of owner default gave rise to the birth of
the "pre-sales"- programs designed to sell a building off before
it was built. Lending institutions "wanted 60-70% of the sales
delivered before they would arrange any more condo financing".6
To meet their demands for up-front cash, legendary high-pressure
pre-selling tactics were developed, largely by the team of a real
estate advertising executive and a Summit marketing and sales
vice-president-turned-broker. 7
Where the $99-down program failed to sustain demand for the
product, and the pre-sales were not always effective, the
emergence of province-wide rent control took over.
"There was a critical shortage of rental housing. The last
unassisted residential apartment building had been built in
the City of Toronto in 1971; anything new would have
required a rent of $1,500 on a one-bedroom unit to make it
economically feasible. Toronto's apartment vacancy had worn
away to less than one per cent." 8
Since the early 1980's, Toronto's condominium market has
been on a roller coaster ride. In 1981, the market hit a
feverish peak but by 1982, a sudden glut of units caused it to
bottom out.
"By 1981 the condomimium market was hot - too hot, in fact.
As the buying public started paying attention to condos, so
did speculators. They began putting down payments of $5,000
or so on several units at a time with the intention of
flipping them - reselling the properties at a profit as soon
as the building was built. The problem was that the
speculator interest created an artificially high demand for
condominium projects, and new developments soon started
flooding the market." 9
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In 1983, the industry began another climb 'up the track', a
direction which has not yet been reversed. Toronto's healthy
economy, combined with lowering interest rates, offshore
investors and speculators, and a pent-up demand for shelter drove
Toronto real estate prices through the roof, starting in 1985.
People were buying up anything and everything in sight, and the
city began a great expansion to the north, east and west.
"By 1986, they [prices] were skyrocketing: a record of
14,000 units disappeared off the market in Toronto and its
surrounding areas... " 10
In 1988, condominium demand in the City of Toronto is very
high, with "89% of the product currently available... [having]
been pre-sold, in advance of construction starts." The average
price per square foot has increased 49%, from $179 (1987) to $267
per square foot in the first quarter of 1988. At the same
time, there has been an evolution from larger suites at lower
cost to smaller suites at a higher per square foot cost (new
"product").
Development controls have severely constrained supply at a
time when demand for all sizes, locations and prices of condo
units appears to be unsatisfiable.
"In the face of this shortage, demographic and house price
factors are at work in the community favouring an
acceleration of condominium development. These factors
include an aging population, new household formations, and
rapidly increasing prices in the resale housing market." 12
The suburban market, in contrast, is "thus far reasonably
well supplied with product. However, those projects experiencing
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the best sales absorptions this year generally have minimal
competition in their local market areas..." 13
The Toronto condominium development industry is now
characterized by splintering and specialization, to cater to
different consumer groups - urban and suburban, young
professionals, empty nesters and senior citizens. The
industry is led by four RED companies, listed here in descending
order based on production volume: Summit*, Rosedale*, Masson* and
Blackmoor . There has been a refinement-to-an-art of
high-pressure pre-sales, and generally, a growing sophistication
in the industry. Many marketing consultancies have sprung up to
aid developers, and their expertise is now being "exported" to
the rest of Canada, United States and Europe.
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DEVELOPER: YORKTOWNE GROUP
COMPANY DESCRIPTION:
The Yorktowne Group is a privately owned Toronto RED firm
which began after the Second World War, initially building houses
and then moving into lot development. Although the firm has
since acquired or developed numerous properties in Ontario,
Florida and Texas, Toronto land development is still the firm's
primary business. It holds a current inventory of 1100 acres
valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Yorktowne's staff
totals eight in number, including a receptionist and two
bookkeepers.
Yorktowne was introduced to the condominium development
business in the early '80s, when Summit offered to buy a piece of
land in the firm's inventory zoned for high-density residential
development. Intrigued by Summit's idea of developing
condominiums, Yorktowne chose to joint venture with them rather
than sell the land off. Vice President Richard Rosen* saw an
opportunity to learn as much as he could about a new industry:
"They [Summit] were clearly the industry leaders, and we acted
like sponges." This arrangement set the tone for many of
Yorktowne's subsequent projects, in which joint venture partners
exposed the firm to condo product development techniques.
The Summit-Yorktowne deal involved 3 buildings, with a total
of 670 suites. Although a pre-sale program was well organized
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for the first phase of 70 suites, only 10 were sold before the
project broke ground. Rosen explained: "As soon as we started to
build, the interest rates shot up." The market suddenly became so
volatile that a third partner in the venture panicked and wanted
out. "No sooner did [the third partner] sign the papers
[releasing him from the deal] did the market turn around, and
within 8 weeks, the 60 remaining units in the first building sold
out." Within another two months, a pre-sale effort sold out a
second phase of the project.
After a market roller-coaster ride and initial lesson on
condominium development, Yorktowne decided to initiate its own
condo project. They chose from their formidable inventory a
suitably zoned suburban site. However, they realized that they
still lacked sufficient know-how to proceed on their own, so they
accepted a joint-venture offer from another firm, Acme
*
Developments
After building a condo building with Acme, Yorktowne went
solo on its third and most recent project.
ASSUMPTION OF A PROACTIVE OR REACTIVE STANCE:
Rosen believed that the condominium product development
process was "definitely reactive". He observed from his work
with Summit that if product already built was not selling,
Summit's president "wasn't afraid to rip the guts out of a
ten-storey column of suites already built and to start anew."
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This was considered to be cheaper than holding on to the
inventory. "What do you do when the market changes quickly?
...They [Summit] literally made changes to their product."
On the other hand, Rosen acknowledged that pre-sale activity
offered the developer a chance to devise a proactive strategy.
Before the pre-sale phase, a developer had the opportunity to
shape his product, while the pre-sale period allowed him to sell
it before it was actually fabricated. He saw this as a
challenge:
"In a pre-sale market, people are buying from plans, without
having seen the real product. The biggest problem is, "Are
the people buying going to have faith in what they don't
see?"
ANALYSIS OF MARKET AND MARKET OPPOSITION:
Yorktowne took its lessons in market analysis from Summit.
In their first joint venture, Rosen watched Summit commence its
work by obtaining a market study, prepared by an outside market
analyst. However, he noticed that building design decisions were
not based on this study but on the Summit president's intuitive
understanding of the market.
Neither Yorktowne nor their joint venture partners seemed to
have confidence in the market when their projects were initiated,
so marketing people were hired. Rosen explained: "We were
interested in what their perceptions would be, and took input
from them." Even so, Rosen's observations led him to take very
little stock in market analyses and their value in the product
development process:
33
"It's impossible to forecast the market... I think that the
market operates independent of [data] knowledge, no matter
what you think you know... Market analysts give you a nice
thick report [of data] on all existing condos. They're
statistical analysts - good number crunchers, but not
gurus."
ZOOMING IN ON A TARGET:
Rosen explained that certain marketing companies tried to
target projects by soliciting responses to advertising for a
particular location, "send[ing] out priority registration forms
and creat[ing] a lot of hype. We don't subscribe to that." What
Yorktowne did subscribe to was intuition and a do-it-yourself
approach. Rosen identified targets for his firm's projects and
oversaw their translation into design. To create appropriate
suite designs, he said, "You have to divorce yourself from
yourself and try to think like the person in the marketplace."
Yorktowne learned that purchasers fell into two distinct
groups, the speculators and the "live-ins" (i.e., those who were
purchasing a roof over their heads). A firm stance was taken
with respect to target definition:
"We're in business for providing housing, not for providing
a commodity. In a hot market, you don't need the speculator
and in a weak market you don't want him because you don't
know if he'll close... We can't stop speculators from
buying in our projects, but we certainly don't design for
them."
FORMULATION OF OVERALL STRATEGY:
Through its joint-venture work, Yorktowne developed a
'method' of product planning that was incremental, very informal,
and learn-as-you-go. Rosen valued the use of intuition. On the
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other hand, such informality of process resulted in
inefficiencies.
At the outset of the Yorktowne-Acme joint-venture, an
architect was hired; site plans and a full set of architectural
drawings were generated for an 18 storey, 200 suite building.
Once the drawings were completed, the developers realized that
the design was inferior. Only then did it occur to them that the
architect's expertise was in office rather than residential
condominium buildings.
"We didn't think that [hiring an architect without condo
experience] would be a problem, but it was... We took one
look at the plans and threw them all out. Acme told us:
'Forget all about your architect and marketing people; we'll
use our own.' So we threw out the whole team except for the
electrical and mechanical consultants and the landscape
architect, and started fresh."
The joint-venture partners decided to hold a
"mini-competition" between the old architect and Acme's "new"
architect. Rosen saw that " Acme's [architect] produced a much
better design", and a choice was thus made. Even so, the
developers were still not sitting comfortably. What was
characterized as a "fear of the market" ultimately led the one
building to be designed as two phases - one block cut in half.
The developers needed to put all the amenities (pool, rec room,
etc.) in the first half and were forced to duplicate hundreds of
thousands of dollars worth of structural elements, stairwells and
mechanical equipment.
Competing development firms and their projects were viewed
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as "unknown quantities". In one of its developments, Yorktowne
knew that Summit and Rosedale* were also planning projects
nearby, but initially proceeded without any real strategy for
dealing with this fact. As it happened, the competing projects
were closer to traffic and noise than Yorktowne's building; once
salespeople picked up on this "competitive advantage", they
started to market the product accordingly. Yorktowne learned to
capitalize on feedback from initial sales reports in this way.
DESIGN OF THE MARKETING MIX:
Rosen believed that location was the most critical factor in
project success, surpassing design: "You can have a dog's
breakfast [for a product] but location will sell [it]." However,
he held, "You have a better chance of selling in a slow market if
you've got better quality."
Yorktowne looked for "an egoless architect" to design its
condo buildings. "A good architect knows room proportions...
There are a few who do the lion's share of work [in Toronto], and
know the market as well, since they're pumping out thousands of
suites a year." Rosen worked with existing design standards.
"[We used] mostly his [the architect's] ideas, but we
coached him... the process was 'You gotta pull this, squeeze
this, change that...'" The process is very simple: we start
with the envelope, which dictates the constraints. We go to
an architect, and ask him to give us some ideas... His
ideas come forward, and then we pick and choose [among
them]. Our process is based on gut feel and not on [the
dictates] of marketing."
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Rosen believed that 'gut feel' improved with experience, and
recognized the importance and usefulness of a track record for a
developer. Product innovation, however, was not much of a
concern. Rosen held that no creative ideas in suite layout or
design were emerging in Toronto, but that the market had "made a
quantum leap out of boxes, to boxes with amenities." The general
rule of thumb was that "the developer tries to give the least for
the most, and the sales person tries to give the most for the
least."
Although Rosen seemed somewhat skeptical about marketing
consultants' market reports, he believed in their condo pricing
strategies. For one of its 'solo' projects, Yorktowne wanted a
marketing program which would the greatest possible revenue from
sales. Since the market was very active at the time, Yorktowne
could possibly have sold off 250 units in a week, but Rosen did
not feel that this was the most advantageous approach. Instead,
he chose the following sales strategy:
"We went to Summit's marketing consultants, who told us that
if we followed a certain pattern, we'd sell out in six
months. They told us to sell 3 suites in certain locations
- the price will jump - sell another 3 - the price will jump
again... We kept the number of choices down to 3 suite
types for the building, and used a price differential to
move these suites... Sure enough, we sold out on six months
to the very day."
PRODUCT TESTING:
Although Rosen did not engage in test marketing, he allowed:
"I go over every suite with my wife... She looks for an efficient
suite, one with 'good flow' and sensible room proportions."
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VIEWS ON THE PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS:
In Rosen's view of the product development process, "it was
fairly obvious as to what the product was going to be." Choices
that could be made revolved around factors of timing and around
"the nature of the physical structure - how big? how dense?"
Rosen summarized: "Like any developer, we want[ed] as big and as
much as possible... It was a matter of fitting our blocks into a
given envelope."
Rosen believed that even though RED firms were building
condominiums, the government played a major role in the product
development process. Legislators controlled many product
decisions:
"The work is initiated by the municipality, which designates
the [land] use, the maximum building envelopes... controls
timing [of development]... [and sequence of] development
release in a given area."
Cognizant of the favourable current market climate, Rosen hinted
that a product development process was a moot point now:
"In a hot market, the biggest fool can be a good condominium
developer... We've gone through a period in the last three
years where everybody's selling everything and anything."
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DEVELOPER: ROSEDALE LIMITED
COMPANY DESCRIPTION:
Rosedale Limited is a multi-billion dollar publically-owned
real estate company, begun in the late 1950s. Employing over
2,000 people, it is established in 35 markets throughout Canada
and the United States. According to its recent annual report,
"[t]he Company owns and manages more than 32 million
square feet of leasable space in shopping centers, office
properties, business parks, hotels and residential apartment
complexes... As a developer and masterplanner of
residential communities in Ontario and California, Rosedale
also constructs and markets a wide range of family housing,
from starter homes and elegant residences to luxury
condominiums."
Rosedale entered the condominium business in the early
1970s, during their development of a new town near Toronto. Over
the years, the firm evolved into the second largest condo
developer in Toronto and all of Canada; in terms of volume, only
Summit surpassed it. Since the early 1980s, Rosedale began a
program of buiding "quality" condominiums in both urban centre
and suburban fringe areas of Toronto, targeted to upper
middle-class and "upper end" markets. While some of the earlier
projects were immediately successful, a few others suffered from
poor market timing (one took five years to sell out).
About ten projects were initiated in Toronto and Ottawa
within the last 2 years, each with an average project value of
$25 million. The year 1988 saw an increase in production of 600
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units over last, and Rosedale hoped to increase that number
before year end. Condominium projects were handled by the
High-Rise Residential Group, headed by Vice-President Dan Parks*.
The division's Manager of Research and Product Development was
*
Philip O'Connell . Unless otherwise noted, all quotes herein are
attributable to Parks and O'Connell.
CORPORATE MISSION AND OBJECTIVES:
O'Connell explained that Rosedale Residential Group's
corporate aim was to have people "buy 'up'" in Rosedale
projects:
"Sure, it's easy to sell off floor plans, but once they
[purchasers) move in, we want them to be happy, because
they'll be our future customers... We put more into
amenities and landscaping... We want to be in it for the
long term. We want to keep people buying from Rosedale
because of quality... We're now going on an "In Search of
Excellence Program"- we exist not to make money, but for the
customer. We'll always have a customer, our base, our
referrals - we have to take care of them to stay in business
and be successful."
Vice-President Parks looked at condominium development
through two lenses, business and market. He considered the
business context (related to interest rates and hard costs) to be
more critical and pivotal than marketing concerns in condominium
development. Business decisions involved "intuition and
crystal-balling", and "failures [were] based on a lack of
business acumen in forecasting the future rather than on [poor]
marketing strategies." Parks believed that it was easier to make
business predictions than market ones since "[market] decisions
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today [were] based on today's market", and that downside
protection came from business rather than marketing policies. It
was Parks' conviction that "if the market changed, the business
approach [would] change but not the marketing [strategy]."
ANALYSIS OF MARKET AND MARKET OPPOSITION:
To make decisions about product possibilities on a chosen
site, Parks asked: "What does the market want?" He and O'Connell
had a wide network of people who provided Rosedale with both
formal analyses and ear-to- the-ground information. Even so,
neither put too much faith in market forecasts. O'Connell
pointed out:
"In 1986, the market was supposed to slow down, but didn't.
In '87, the market was really supposed to slow down, but we
sold more units than ever before. Experience is critical:
following the market is o.k. but not enough... The [market
analysis] numbers cannot tell you everything ... we have to
go by our experience."
Rosedale obtained demographic analyses of a site from
outside consultants, to a level of detail depending on "how much
time [was) available and on the level of comfort with the site."
Such an analysis would be typically bounded by a radius of two
miles around the site; it assumed that inhabitants of this area
were the most likely future condo purchasers. Rosedale's next
step was to find out as much as possible about potential buyers
through "psychodemographics", a demographic analysis that
quantified psychological profiles.
O'Connell pointed out Rosedale's emphasis on "conducting
41
research and getting feedback on architectural features, image
and environments that people want". "Focus-study groups"
provided a great deal of input. Throughout, the process was
"more intuitive, less quantitative".
On the topic of competitive analysis and evaluation,
O'Connell allowed that "there's no scientific method". To price
a chosen site, Rosedale looked at the selling prices for
comparable land for the last six month period. The next step
was:
"[to] look at all the competition's stuff - what they are
charging per square foot, what's successful in terms of
suite size... [and to] find out about the best selling
plans, their purchasers, and the kind of advertising which
attracts them".
This information could be gotten from marketing consultants
(in neatly compiled reports), but also from keeping one's ear to
the ground. From the data, a determination could be made of the
best mix of units (suite size and type) for the best
capitalization.
Parks' attitude towards competition was that "they're all
the same... [in the sense that] all [are] vying for the same
buyer." Their research methods and market data were also viewed
as potentially "the same [as Rosedale's]", since all other firms
had access to the same basic market information. Parks stressed
that his firm's competitive advantage was its track record,
backed up by "pure [business) research". O'Connell also
emphasized Rosedale's track record rather than its marketing
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practices as its edge in condominium production:
"The one-time builder doesn't have the financial backing and
expertise to stay in [the game) in good times and bad. A
smaller builder may panic in bad times, or retract on
promises, whereas a bigger firm is much more stable."
ZOOMING IN ON A TARGET:
Target markets were identified through the initial research,
and were generally one of three generic types: the first-time
buyer, the double-income-no-kids household, and empty-nesters.
"People are buying a lifestyle... We have to target right...
land is becoming more expensive," O'Connell said. Rosedale "paid
a lot into marketing expenses" to achieve this end. Consumer
responses to newspaper advertisements helped to further define
the targets.
Rosedale viewed Toronto as a conservative market rather than
a moving target. Except for the downtown market, the firm
considered potential purchasers to be very unsophisticated.
FORMULATION OF SPECIFIC MARKETING OBJECTIVES; OVERALL STRATEGY:
0' Connell suggested that Rosedale had a regular process for
condominium project development, one that began with land
investigation, and continued with market and competitive
analyses, target definition, proforma planning, project design
and consumer testing.
At the outset, a land investigation team typically searched
for land, either through a broker, a tip or through Rosedale's
own planning investigations. Once a site was selected, research
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was conducted into its planning status and history. O'Connell
noted that a site was not purchased until a lot of front-end
research had been completed and numbers run.
When the market analyses came in and the competition had
been assessed, the construction and residential vice-presidents
created a rough building programme, and then tried to ascertain
hard and soft costs of the possible project to determine the land
residual (i.e., the acceptable price of land). Rosedale worked
to a minimum target of 15% profit, and devoted considerable
attention to financial details. "We take pride in our pro-forma
and construction analyses. All divisions are in place to protect
against the downside," O'Connell explained.
As an example of his company's overall strategy, O'Connell
described the very first Rosedale condo project to be located in
particular Toronto suburb. Unsure about market acceptance of the
proposal, the project team decided to spread the perceived market
risks by targeting three groups in one building, and by dealing
conservatively with the product design and price. O'Connell
explained:
"In the first phase of any project, we try to cut out risks
by playing very conservatively... We'll normally go with
the market... then, [in the second phase, we build] less
conservatively, and then - we 'go for it'. On the last
phase, you [sic] want to be able to capitalize on what's
been done before."
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DESIGN OF MARKETING MIX:
Project ideas, architectural and otherwise, generally came
from Parks. He initiated a project by gathering together his
research team (headed by O'Connell), land investigation team, one
on-staff architect and draftsman, and a representative from one
outside architectural firm (which prepared the drawings). At the
outset, a views analysis was often conducted (by helicopter) to
help in architectural planning purposes.
The most risky aspects of the product development process,
O'Connell believed, were "determining suite size and the image of
a project". Suite sizing was very tricky: "Once a project is in
the ground, it's next to impossible to change the unit sizes
because the structure is in place." Image could whet or destroy a
purchaser's appetite; people would "sacrifice suite size and
money to get the aura of high quality" and were very fussy about
externalities. O'Connell called this "snob appeal". Rosedale
found that they could convey appropriate product images through
thoroughly designed advertising, public relations, and graphics.
PRODUCT TESTING:
Once a target market was identified, advertising was often
placed in a newspaper, vaguely describing a project and
soliciting responses from interested parties. Those who mailed
in their responses were often sent a short questionnaire to fill
out, elaborating on their design preferences. Only then was a
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preliminary building design produced, and potential purchasers
(from the mailing list) invited to a group showing of individual
suite plans. Such a "focus group" would provide the feedback for
further design refinement. O'Connell described the process thus:
"First we get their opinions [so that they'll be open and
unbiased], and then we show them the [already-prepared) plans."
As a follow-up, more elaborate and detailed surveys were sent
through the mail to these people. "We attempt to find out what
kind of features people are used to in their homes."
VIEWS ON THE PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS:
On Rosedale's product development strategy, O'Connell
commented: "We do the same in a weak or strong market, except we
anticipate land prices to be lower [in a weaker market]." In a
good market the company could "make more money by creating an
aura of quality". Construction was deemed to be the least risky
aspect of the whole process ("We have an excellent construction
division").
Rosedale's competitive edge, according to O'Connell (the
Product Development Manager), was "a strong product development
process". At the same time, he pointed out the temptation of a
never-ending process:
"In our product development, we use a chair analogy. We
keep wanting to make a more comfortable chair, keep trying
to improve on our product... Sometimes, Dan Parks has to
tell us to stop, because we keep trying to make
improvements, even at the very last minute."
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O'Connell stated that the driving force behind the
condominium product was a legislated one. New rent control laws
convinced Rosedale to abandon its proposals for rental buildings
in 1984, and to concentrate its efforts fully on the condominium
product. "Rent controls have made the condominium industry what
it is today."
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ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPERS
A distinguishing feature of the two interviewed RED firms
was that each had a specific person (or persons) whose job it was
to oversee the product development (or design and marketing)
process. Many other firms contacted as potential sites had no
organizational mechanism for dealing with these issues. In
Yorktowne's case, one person handled product and marketing very
informally, while at Rosedale, these concerns were handled in a
highly structured way by the Executive Vice-President of the
Residential Group and his Manager of Research and Product
Development.
The firms interviewed were at opposite ends of the
organizational spectrum; one (Rosedale) was a conspicuously
large, publically-owned RED company, and the other
(Yorktowne) a tiny, low-profile private company. Rosedale had a
well-defined approach to the process of product development,
while Yorktowne's method was ad-hoc and learn-as-you-go. When a
company had two thousand employees and had to answer to thousands
of stockholders, its product development and decision-making
processes necessarily had to be methodical and highly
rationalized. In the case of a company of eight employees, it
needed only answer to itself, and did not necessarily require of
itself a highly rationalized formula.
The firms were also at the opposite ends of the condominium
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product experience spectrum, thus at different positions on the
product development "learning curve". Rosedale had been
producing condominiums for almost twenty years, and had a kit of
efficient and effective techniques which it could use again and
again. Yorktowne, on the other hand, commissioned and discarded
an entire set of design drawings and switched architects before
it could settle into its first project without Summit. Perhaps
Rosedale was at Summit's stage twenty years ago.
Aside from the obvious difference in RED firm sizes and
norms, another possible explanation for Yorktowne's and
Rosedale's different marketing and product development approaches
was rooted in the kinds of resources that each had. To initiate
a project, Rosedale first had to search for land and produce
fairly exhaustive detailed up-front studies to determine project
feasibility and the price that they could pay for the land.
Since Yorktowne already had a huge supply of well-located land,
the single most sought after development resource in Toronto, it
did not have to engage itself in such massive feasibility
studies. Moreover, its riches attracted many suitors in the form
of joint-venturers who could provide the necessary condo product
development know-how.
CORPORATE MISSION AND OBJECTIVES:
In its product development process, Rosedale had a clearly
articulated philosophies of "pursuit of excellence" and "customer
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first". It wished to develop brand recognition and loyalty among
its condominium purchasers so that they would continue to buy
products under the Rosedale name. The firm catered to customers'
needs and offered them the highest construction quality possible,
and as a result believed it could cultivate a large group of
repeat purchasers.
While Yorktowne lacked an elaborate corporate philosophy,
Rosen stressed that his company was in the business of getting
people housed. This company was not oriented towards brand
recognition or loyalty (its volume of work was much smaller than
Rosedale's), but concentrated on maintaining its credibility in
the marketplace one project at a time.
Both Rosedale and Yorktowne had clearly articulated profit
goals. Regardless of any marketing work which either undertook
(and both firms were familiar with the marekting and product
development concepts as per Chapter One), the overriding
philosophy for each company was that it was business- rather than
market-driven. This thinking is typical of the real estate
industry, which tends to view "marketing" as disjointed from
"business", not an integral part of it.
ASSUMPTION OF A PROACTIVE OR REACTIVE STANCE:
Yorktowne's approach to product development was "definitely
reactive". It learned to make market-responsive changes by
watching Summit's reactive methods, an incremental approach to
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decision-making. Its products imitated the competition: the firm
subscribed to the "me-too" school of design.
Rosedale could be reactive or proactive, depending on the
perceived degree of business risk. During the first phase of any
project, Rosedale adopted a highly conservative approach of
"go[ing] with the market" (i.e., imitating competitors'
products]. However, the firm's product research and development
arm was used in later phases of a project, when the risks were
perceived to be less.
ANALYSIS OF MARKET AND MARKET OPPOSITION:
Neither firm was overly trusting of market survey data,
claiming that there was no scientific method to understanding
market or consumer behaviour. Both believed that "experience"
was the basis for intuitive forecasts.
Both Rosedale and Yorktowne considered every RED firm
(big or small) as competition, since all sought the same targets
as customers. Even so, the firms' views on their competition
varied considerably. In Yorktowne's case, Rosen did not actively
think or strategize about competitors or their products until his
project was already on the sales floor. In contrast, Rosedale
the benefit of twenty years of condo experience. Its competitive
monitoring involved developing a picture of what competitors were
doing (to guide Rosedale's product design direction), and
cultivating an understanding of competitors' "total business
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strengths and capabilities". As its edge over other RED
firms, Rosedale valued its track record and its financial
capability to withstand market ups and downs. Rosedale knew that
it could afford to take more product-related risks than many of
its competitors, since it was better cushioned for any fall.
ZOOMING IN ON A TARGET:
Both Yorktowne and Rosedale had clear target profiles to
work with, Yorktowne's developed intuitively and Rosedale's
through research (questionnaires and focus groups). The buying
public (in the suburban market) was considered by both Yorktowne
and Rosedale to be relatively unsophisticated.
FORMULATION OF SPECIFIC MARKETING OBJECTIVES; OVERALL STRATEGY:
Rosedale's objectives and strategy were explicit, organized,
and institutionalized; Yorktowne's were ad-hoc and
learn-as-you-go. Rosedale stressed that its marketing strategies
would be the same in a weak or strong market; Yorktowne's
unstructured approach was totally market responsive. While the
firm with a strong product development process had a better
chance of survival in a downturn market, a formalized and rigid
process could threaten market responsiveness.
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DESIGN OF MARKETING MIX:
Both Yorktowne and Rosedale believed that product design
took its cues from market and consumer studies, but that it was
the intuition and judgement of the developer which translated
data into product specifics. Both the art and science of the
process were valued.
PRODUCT TESTING:
Rosedale had a "by the book" test-marketing approach, one
that relied on questionnaires, focus groups and extensive
documentation of purchaser preferences. Yorktowne did not engage
in this activity; Rosen took design drawings home to his wife for
her review. In spite of such a difference, each method seemed to
work well for its proponents, given the current market.
VIEWS ON THE PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS:
Both Yorktowne and Rosedale stressed that the condominium
product development process was highly intuitive, and at the same
time based on a decision-maker's ability to interpret numbers and
hard data. Overall, the small firm relied more on intuition,
while the large one also used a defined process.
Both firms were of the opinion that government (local and
provincial) was a major actor in the product development process,
because of rent control policies and legal controls on zoning and
building. Yorktowne and Rosedale also operated with the belief
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that market changes could never fully be predicted and dealt with
proactively. The firms thus inferred that the strongest forces
behind a product and its fate were not its development process,
creativity or innovation but legislated circumstance and an
uncontrollable market climate. Even so, the firms had
substantial latitude to develop, create and innovate, within
those legislative bounds.
54
MARKETING CONSULTANT: EDMUNDS MARKETING AND COMMUNICATION
"In downtown Toronto... [Bob Edmunds*] describes the market
for... . a mid-priced condominium... as "an attitude. A
feeling. A style.. .Kiwis and persimmons. Balsamic vinegar.
Fresh pasta and pesto. Calamari.. .jazz, beaches,
cocaine..." " 16
COMPANY DESCRIPTION:
*
Edmunds Marketing and Communication, Inc. (EMC) , a Toronto
agency with a staff of 18, is involved in advertising and
marketing activities for 30% of the condominiums in the Metro
Toronto market. Of the approximately 8,000 condo units which
Summit has sold over the past three years, about 5,000 of these
were marketed by the Edmunds firm alone. Before starting EMC,
company principal Bob Edmunds* studied marketing at a prestigious
U.S. business school, apprenticed with a mid-sized developer,
then served as Marketing Director at Rosedale.
It was Edmunds' contention that organized marketing and
product strategies were necessary for successful condominium
development. He clarified two kinds of condo marketing
operations going on in Toronto: selling and imaging. Selling,
which he did not do, was either "open" (allowing for a free flow
of buyers into a sales pavilion) or "controlled" (involving the
creation of a high-pressure, panic-bound sales environment which
worked on a "Boxing Day sale" principle). EMC's special area of
concentration was "imaging", applying consumer research to
product design. Edmunds' role: "I apply personalities to
55
buildings."
EMC considered its product development management role to
most valuable in the develt of a market downturn. Acknowledging
the currently heated state of the Toronto condominium market,
Edmunds felt that when the situation cooled down in the future,
"a company's track record will come to bear. The press is
already starting to talk about the failure of some
developers to deliver the product they've promised."
ASSUMPTION OF A PROACTIVE OR REACTIVE STANCE:
Edmunds observed that developers worried a great deal about
the carrying costs associated with unsold product, and held that
"initial market research [was] critical" in defining a product
with the greatest chance of success (i.e., sales and revenue). He
advocated a proactive stance to product development, and believed
that the pre-sale mode encouraged such a strategy.
Because Edmunds had come into contact with many of Toronto's
condo developers during his years as a marketing consultant, he
was asked whether he considered the product development process
to be reactive or proactive. He replied:
"Reactive. Developers are entrepreneurial by nature. But
it's becoming more proactive because the stakes are much
higher now... Marginal players [without a marketing
strategy] will get wiped out."
ANALYSIS OF MARKET AND MARKET OPPOSITION:
For its hard data, Edmunds subscribed to a quarterly condo
market report produced by Toronto's sole condo market analyst.
Assuming that consumer appeal for a particular site extended in a
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one to two mile radius from a site, regression analysis over this
area provided a "smooth buyer profile" for EMC.
"The market is relatively simple to understand," Edmunds
commented. "We look at two things: affordability and
preference." Affordability was quantitative, referring to the
kinds of down-payments and mortgage obligations that targetted
people were likely to be able to handle. Preference was
qualitative. It involved the study of psychodemographics, a
merger of numbers and personality traits into a lifestyle
profile, used to guide the program and design of a building.
Edmunds said that this process was instinctive, but that his firm
also "did some interviewing to find out why people were or
weren't purchasing" in a particular project. He believed that
potential purchasers were "a sophisticated group" that merited
study.
Analysis of a developer client's competition involved
studying competing projects, and looking for opportunities to
make product differentiations. Edmunds acknowledged, however,
that the Toronto condominium market was not necessarily product
conscious, since some purchasers were motivated by investment
criteria rather than product particulars. Sight unseen, "whole
buildings have been sold off to Hong Kong investors."
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ZOOMING IN ON A TARGET:
Targetting was seen as the most critical element of the
product development process, and Edmunds believed that there was
a serious problem of some developers "building to ego" rather
than the market, missing issues of affordability, location and
employment base. EMC got its rough buyer profiles from
demographic analyses, and used responses to advertising
("priority registration" forms) to sharpen these profiles.
Edmunds used psychodemographics for product design decisions
on Summit's Riding Club* project, a pre-sold, 700-suite downtown
tower project. Targeted very clearly at "yuppies who weren't
going to eat at home", the program included very small apartments
with "adequate" [i.e., small] kitchens, and a very large fitness
centre.
Another pre-sold condo project which Edmunds considered
extremely successful was very clearly targetted towards
"mid'market empty nesters". The targeting was so effective,
Edmunds believed, that when the purchasers were invited to a
cocktail party after completion of the sales program, "everyone
who came was dressed exactly the same...it was a little scary."
In Edmunds' estimation, he "[had] delivered an Olds to an Olds
driver."
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FORMULATION OF SPECIFIC MARKETING OBJECTIVES; OVERALL STRATEGY:
In a recent publication, Edmunds described the challenge
of the condominium development process thus:
"The modern condominium represents one of the most complex
real estate ventures undertaken today. Beginning with land
acquisition and zoning, proceeding to land development and
then to structural, mechanical and financial decisions
demands the involvement of thousands of professionals. And
the biggest complication is that you can't deliver just one
unit at a time. You have to deliver them all." 17
Edmunds advocated the creation of project teams comprising
many specialists to make product decisions. To illustrate a
typical project organization, he described a recently initiated
condo proposal for downtown Toronto. At the first project
meeting, 14 consultants sat down at the table to discuss the
direction that the building programme should take - including
Edmunds, a sales consultant, project architect, landscape
architect, interior designer, and Toronto's sole private condo
market analyst. Edmunds held that marketing input was necessary
right from any project's inception, and that in his own
experience, a lot of control came from sales and marketing
consultants.
Each project was handled differently. For reasons of
differentiation and positioning, according to the dictates of
marketing, every condo building needed to be imbued with a
different personality.
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DESIGN OF THE MARKETING MIX:
EMC's mandate of creating personalities for projects started
with the naming of the project. Promotional graphics, a sales
pavilion and a "price point" rounded out the project design. In
Edmunds' opinion, architectural offices could not develop such
overall concepts. He also held that many architects could not
design both interiors and exteriors well, and had to be chosen
for "their ability to integrate [the two]". On his own presence
in providing design direction, he commented, "I am a
para-architect."
Edmunds stressed that:
"initial market research is critical [in making
decisions] ... In the case of an experienced builder, the
product is fixed once it goes to market."
PRODUCT TESTING:
EMC's consumer research work included the organization of
focus groups, in which product not yet released for sale could
benefit from the feedback of potential customers.
VIEWS ON THE PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS:
In Edmunds' view, the least risky approaches to product
development were "copying the last success ... [or] a safe product
type", or "doing a project with obvious mass market appeal".
Considered most risky: product differentiation and innovation,
not being attuned to the market, and not being market-driven.
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"Product differentiation is the craft of the marketer,"
Edmunds explained. His view of developers was that they
basically saw condominiums as "a way to yield the maximum dollars
out of the maximum land use", rather than as an opportunity to
innovate. He believed, however, that the growing concern for
exterior aesthetics from municipalities and the buying public was
leading developers to revise their thinking.
According to Edmunds, a successful product was one that
featured clear targetting; pre-sold rapidly at top dollar;
maximized living space in small areas; had innovative finishes
(carpets, colours, lighting details); and had carefully
thought-out amenities. A marketing failure was typically based
on poor targetting, leading to poor sales and lost revenues.
Edmunds cited the case of a project whose advertising drew
response from 10,000 people, for whom the project proved to be
mismatched: "Too many units, too big, too expensive. Only 130
units were sold out of a 500 unit building."
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MARKETING CONSULTANT: HARRISON MARKETING GROUP
COMPANY DESCRIPTION:
*
Harrison Marketing Group (HMG) , a Toronto-based marketing
consulting agency with a staff of 6, has been involved in
planning and sales programmes for over 40 condominium buildings
in Canada, the United States and the Far East. It gained
substantial press and acclaim for its marketing efforts in the
United States, but the majority of HMG's earlier work is located
in Toronto. Both the Yorktowne Group and Rosedale Limited have
employed HMG as a consultant.
Company president Sandra Harrison*, and vice-presidents
* *
Donna McDowell and Leigh Good each began their real-estate
careers selling condominium units in-house for major companies
like Cadillac Fairview and Olympia & York. The thrust of their
work at HMG was design input, sales strategy and overall process
management.
According to a recent publicity brochure for HMG,
"The firm's president believes that each real estate
development is unique, with its own individual position in
the marketplace. This philosophy guides [Harrison Marketing
Consultants] in analysing and evaluating every project.
Every development presents a new opportunity for creative
selling... [At the Harrison] organization.. .practical,
step-by-step strategic planning and implementation of
marketing begins at the conceptual stage of a development
and only ends when the last home is sold."
Questioning the objectivity of many developers when it came
to product development, McDowell firmly stressed that "You [the
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RED firm] need a marketing person to protect yourself from
yourself." HMG believed that it could effectively and objectively
manage the product development process if "hired early enough".
ASSUMPTION OF A PROACTIVE OR REACTIVE STANCE:
Citing instances in the not-so-distant-past where Toronto
RED firms built blindly without considering targets and
suffered the consequences, McDowell acknowledged that "there is a
growing trend for developers to involve a marketing team." She
believed that condominium product development was only now
becoming a proactive rather than reactive process and that
producers were slowly becoming more marketing-driven in their
approaches. (The necessity of pre-selling units compelled
developers to engage in consumer research and strategy). Even
so, Good conceded: "I know that most developers can't stand the
idea of hiring marketing people or an advertising agency."
ANALYSIS OF MARKET AND MARKET OPPOSITION:
HMG's brochure claimed that:
"[a] residential development will only succeed if it suits
the lifestyle of the target markets and has a perceived edge
over the competition. By implementing our consumer research
programme, specifically tailored to meet individual
development needs, our research tells us who the target
markets are, where they presently live, what they are
looking for and when they want it."
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HMG made a clear distinction between market research (i.e.,
demographic number crunching), which it did not do, and consumer
research (preference related), which it did. McDowell suggested
that developers not cling to market and demographic analyses, but
rather, use intuitive market knowledge. On the issue of vacancy
and absorption, she reiterated, "There's no fixed formula.. you
need to understand the market intuitively." Good added: "I've
never seen a market research report where they say: 'Do this!' "
HMG's consumer research process began with a qualitative
competitive analysis, in which it "studied everything in the
proposed project's radius, superior or inferior". Its overriding
conviction was that "you have to sell what's unique to your
project," and thus it began a process of product
differentiation.
ZOOMING IN ON A TARGET:
Demographic analyses from the sole consultant studying the
Toronto condo market provided a rough buyer profile, but HMG
continued its consumer research to collect more specific data. A
clearer target was defined by a "priority list", assembled from
responses to site signage, newspaper publicity and word-of-mouth.
Potential purchasers were then invited to meetings with HMG,
where they filled out lengthy questionnaires ("wish lists") that
encouraged them to share their views on what made for a desirable
unit and unit mix. With this data in hand, HMG compared the wish
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lists with the demographically-based buyer profile. Only then
did the individual suites take form and were optimally arranged
according to size, price, and view.
McDowell differentiated between live-in and investor
targets: For "user" buildings, a marketing person would be
needed, whereas for "investor" buildings, "you need a banker
there [to convince the prospects], not a marketing person."
Since a condominium project could easily have several
"products" aimed at an equal number of targets, HMG recommended
that a "product" not be shown to a prospective purchaser until he
had been "qualified" and matched to a particular unit.
("Qualifying" was defined as the process of finding out enough
about a buyer to define his needs and wants).
FORMULATION OF SPECIFIC MARKETING OBJECTIVES - OVERALL STRATEGY:
HMG promised to provide very thorough input on marketing
strategy and budget. They stressed, however, that no strategy
was final or infallible: "Your initial strategy cannot determine
what [design] they [the prospects] are going to pick... You
always plan for the worst and hope for the best." Each project
had a unique strategy, but all followed the same six basic steps:
1. compilation of priority list; 2. consumer research;
3. reservation program; 4. corporate holds; 5. pricing;
and 6. a pre-sales program.
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McDowell offered that HMG, although valuable in managing the
total marketing process, was not a necessity for a RED firm:
"You can do things on an in-house basis... you don't
[necessarily] have to go out and hire the Harrison* Group,
but you do need to think a great deal about your marketing
strategy."
DESIGN OF THE MARKETING MIX:
The following quotations reflected HMG's philosophy:
"We often find that developers think that they have the
greatest taste, and that their wives [sic] make the best
interior decorators. This can make for a marketing
disaster. As a developer, you really have to put your taste
on the back burner. Your taste doesn't matter - the buyer's
does."
"Design for your target market and not for yourself... design
for appeal, and be consistent."
"Planning should respond directly to the marketing needs of
a building...I'm amazed at the number of well-respected
architects who design a kitchen in such a way that the
fridge door bangs against the wall as you're trying to clean
it. If you don't have a brilliant architect, at least
involve your marketing people...it's all just common sense."
"If you give the architect the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle,
you can start to build a good project."
"Try to build in as much flexibility as you can [to the
design] in case you're wrong... or in case the market goes
into the garbage pail."
McDowell believed that building and fully outfitting a "site
model" (full-scale mock-up) during the pre-sale was "critical to
the sales process...[to] reflect the taste level of ...buyers."
To attract purchasers, she also devised product "hot buttons"
(i.e., strongly targetted selling features) such as particular
kinds of security systems, lobby designs, amenities and views.
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HMG approached the pricing of its real estate wares
methodically. It disagreed with the pre-sales practices of one
prominent local broker, who was known for hoarding priority
registration applications from prospects for months, and then
inviting hundreds of these people for appointments at his sales
pavilion all at the same hour, on the same date. The sales
pavilion would feature loud speakers "announcing" sold units, and
in the ensuing panic, hundreds of people would be coerced to buy
after five-minute high-pressure sales pitches. With this method,
whole buildings could be sold out in a weekend.
McDowell's conviction was that "product can sell too
quickly", and that a phased, orchestrated release of suites was
necessary for real profitability:
"In one Toronto marketing effort, when the building sold
like hot-cakes, it lost a million dollars... the price of
windows or something went up [after the pre-sales], and the
developers lost their shirts. The very first price list is
not where you make the killing... you open a bit below the
market to get things cranking up, and then start raising
your prices."
PRODUCT TESTING:
Once the individual suites took form, optimally arranged
according to size, price, and view, prospective purchasers were
invited back to a meeting with HMG. They were typically shown a
maximum of three "preliminary" floor plans, and asked for
feedback. The suite designs would be reworked again for the
opening of the pre-sale program, and these target-critics would
be given the first opportunity to purchase ("reserve") the units.
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VIEWS ON THE PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS:
McDowell and Good stressed that product differentiation,
innovation and an organized product development process would
give a RED firm its competitive advantage. They spoke from the
perspective of having seen the rise and fall of many condominium
development firms.
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ANALYSIS OF MARKETING CONSULTANTS
Although HMG and EMC were two small companies (with six and
eighteen employees respectively), they had been involved in the
product development processes for a lion's share of the
condominiums in the Toronto market. These firms were hired to
manage and optimize the product development process for
condominium developers. Both companies were valued by the RED
industry.
Both of these consultants engaged in "marketing" and
product development as per the framework in Chapter One.
However, each had a different focus. Founded and staffed by
individuals who cut their teeth as condominium salespeople in a
poor market, HMG approached product development in a pragmatic
and hands-on fashion. In contrast, the academic marketing
background of EMC's principal made him more conversant with
marketing terminology, formal product development frameworks, and
issues of packaging and personality. While HMG dealt for the
most part in process management, EMC concentrated on product
design. Different methodologies aside, these firms had parallel
philosophies about the condominium product development process.
EMC and HMG were in the business of managing the product
development process for condominiums - coordinating the marketing
mix of product, price and promotion. Both firms concentrated on
defining targets, studying the customer profile and fashioning
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the product in its likeness. The quintessential marketing
paradigm of "customer informs product" truly framed their
approaches.
ASSUMING A PROACTIVE OR REACTIVE STANCE:
HMG and EMC considered the Toronto condo development
community to be very reactive, and themselves as proponents of a
proactive approach. Inasmuch as a proactive strategy "explicitly
allocate[d] resources to preempt undesirable future events and
achieve goals", both HMG and Edmunds were involved in this mode
of thinking. Both saw such strategies as means of capturing
larger shares of the market in good times, and protecting the
developer in a downturn. The very fact that they contracted to
create game plans, do front end work and keep the whole product
development process under control confirmed their proactive
stances. Their approaches relied heavily on research and
development, and on marketing approaches which "find a consumer
need and... [build] a product to fill it." Both HMG and EMC had a
strong belief in product differentiation and innovation as a
means of positioning in the marketplace. Both saw pre-sales as
perfect opportunities for proactive work.
Even so, both firms had reactive qualities, since they
attempted to "deal with impinging forces as they occur[red]" on a
project. No matter how much prior strategizing one did, it was
expected that the winds of change (especially in the market,
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customer and competition) could loom over a project's
fate, and these had to be dealt with.
ANALYSIS OF MARKET AND MARKET OPPOSITION:
Neither company prepared demographic studies for projects,
since they did not specialize in market analysis. To help them
define targets, both made reference to analytic reports prepared
by yet another consultant, a sole-source demographic
number-cruncher for the condo industry. Since noone gained any
competitive advantage by having access to the same market data,
one's competitive advantage really came from an ability to
implement this information most effectively and efficiently.
Edmunds' approach was to overlay psychological profiles on the
numbers ("psychodemographics"), while HMG was more interested in
conducting its own qualitative survey of a project's physical and
competitive context.
Both firms strove to differentiate their products from that
of the competition for positioning purposes.
ZOOMING IN ON A TARGET:
Both consultants saw targeting as the central and most
critical step in the entire product development process, since
the marketing mix (of product, price and promotion) took its cues
from a keen understanding of the potential customer. Both
considered the buying public to be very sophisticated, since they
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devoted considerable effort to developing purchaser profiles.
As mentioned previously, both firms started with a
demographic analysis around a site, but developed clearer targets
through the compilation of names from "priority registration"
programmes.
FORMULATION OF SPECIFIC MARKETING OBJECTIVES; OVERALL STRATEGY:
Both consulting firms stressed the importance of having an
overall product strategy thought out from a project's inception,
and of having marketing consultants on the project team from day
one to provide strategic input. Each consultant's project had a
unique plan of action. Both articulated product goals, and
mapped out process charts and schedules; however, HMG's approach
was more precisely defined. Thought-out processes of product
development are highly valued, but too much definition can become
a liability rather than an asset. When formula and method
override creativity and responsiveness, any marketing strategy
can be adversely affected.
DESIGN OF MARKETING MIX:
According to both firms, design, style and taste were all
sharp arrows to be aimed carefully at a specific target.
McDowell believed that developers' biases, if allowed to dominate
the product development process, could be disastrous since
developers were not the customers. Both cautioned the danger of
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developers "building to ego rather than to the market" (Edmunds).
The role of the consultants was to dispense objective stylistic
and planning advice for the entire marketing mix.
Both McDowell and Edmunds viewed themselves as important
contributors to the architectural design process. In each case,
they provided strong design input, Edmunds by giving projects
stylistic identity, and McDowell by literally reworking
architects' concepts and drawings.
Pricing and promotion were viewed as integrated portions of
the marketing mix "whole". HMG's emphasis was on pricing and
sales; Edmunds' was on promotional packaging (the design of
project logos, brochures, advertising campaigns and the sales
environment). In both instances, clear methodologies had evolved
which were applicable to many projects.
PRODUCT TESTING:
Both firms conducted condo product testing, soliciting ideas
and comments from prospects even before any product was shown to
them. Once a preliminary product was shown to prospects, it was
refined several times before it was released into a pre-sale
environment.
VIEWS ON THE PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS:
Both held that developers and architects were not
necessarily capable of managing the design process, and that
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outside expertise was needed for this challenge. When taken on a
members of project teams, they believed that they held a lot of
control in the product development process. It was their unique
job to prepare and coordinate the marketing mix (product,
promotion, price) for the RED firms' profitability.
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CHAPTER THREE. JOINT ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
THE DEVELOPER AND MARKETING CONSULTANTS:
COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS
While Rosedale and Yorktowne were in the business of
producing condominiums, EMC and HMG were in the business of
managing the condominium product development process. Their
operating paradigms differed greatly, since the developers were
business-oriented and the consultants were marketing-driven. The
marketing people concentrated on finding a consumer need and
creating a product to satisfy it. The developers, on the other
hand, focused on production rather than on filling customer
needs. For example, the developers chose sites and decided to
build condos first before finding out about their potential
customers.
The marketing consultants espoused a proactive philosophy
(involving forward planning and innovation), while the developers
generally had a strong reactive approach to condominium product
development. In the event of a market downturn, the marketers
came prepared with contingency plans; the developers generally
did not.
Neither the developers nor the consultants were overly
devoted to data; none of them believed that there was a
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scientific method to understanding market and consumer behaviour.
All understood that no one developer had a competitive advantage
based on information, but that this advantage came from a firm's
ability to translate data into business insight.
Whereas the developers reckoned that competitive advantage
came from one's track record, the consultants held that a
developer's edge came from market responsiveness and from product
differentiation (the ability to fill new niches). However,
having a strong and informed product development process was seen
by all as an edge.
All parties believed that targeting was critical to a
product's success, although the developers and marketing
consultants did not share similar views on the sophistication
levels of customers. While the marketers considered the buying
public to be highly sophisticated, the developers inferred that
the buying public was not overly discriminating. The notion of
targeting comes from a marketing philosophy which never
underestimates the customer, therefore the developers had either
misinterpreted the term or espoused conflicting values.
The large developer had an explicit, organized and
institutionalized strategy for product development, while the
smaller firm had an ad-hoc way of proceeding through stages of a
condominium project. In a similar vein, one marketing consultant
had a more methodical process than the other. While a set
process is better than an unspecified one for developers and
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consultants alike, there is danger at both ends of the spectrum.
The developers held that they were capable of making all
product design decisions, and that the product development
process required intuition plus the decision-makers' ability to
interpret numbers and hard data. In distinction, the marketing
consultants believed that they were most valuable in providing
objective input for the design of the marketing mix (product,
price and promotion), since they considered developers to be
lacking the necessary objective distance from product. HMG and
EMC posited that developers and architects alone were not
necessarily capable of handling the product development process,
and that outside expertise was necessary to complement their
skills.
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CONCLUSIONS
At the beginning of this research, the following questions
were asked:
How do developers make decisions about what gets built once
a basic product type and market location have been chosen?
How might these processes be, at worst, remedied, or at
best, enhanced?
Given that real estate literatures ignore the topic of
product development, how applicable is a product development
process model from the consumer and industrial goods sectors
in regard to the formation of the real estate "product"?
To answers these questions, many literatures on product
development were studied and a framework of recurrent themes was
synthesized from them; a single product type and a market context
were chosen; two (each) of the product's developers and marketing
consultants were interviewed; and finally, the cases resulting
from the interviews were analyzed comparatively according to the
product development framework.
Following are the findings of the study.
1. THE PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM FROM THE CONSUMER AND
INDUSTRIAL GOODS AND SERVICES SECTORS IS APPLICABLE TO THE STUDY
OF TORONTO CONDOMINIUM PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT.
The notions of developing a proactive or reactive stance,
analyzing the market and competition, targeting, forming a
strategy, developing a marketing mix, and test marketing apply as
well for a condominium as they do for the proverbial toaster
oven. Although it is beyond the scope of this study, it is
78
surmised that that the consumer product development model is
applicable to other real estate products in addition to
condominiums.
The obvious must be noted. A real estate product is a much
more complicated one than an a household appliance, in scale,
programme, and fabrication. A toaster oven model can be altered
a countless number of times to suit market requirements or
feedback, but a twenty storey condominium building lacks the
luxury of continous adjustment once the base structure has been
poured. This observation underscores the necessity of the RED
firm "getting it right" the first time.
2. HAVING IN PLACE AN INFORMED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND
AN INTERNAL MECHANISM FOR DEALING WITH IT IS IMPORTANT FOR ALL
RED FIRMS.
In the interview selection process for RED companies, it
was found that more than half of the firms contacted had no
internal mechanism for dealing with issues of product development
(design and marketing). If the function of these real estate
firms is to produce condominiums for a buying public (i.e.,
products for consumers), who is 'minding the factory'? Requoting
Rosen,
"In a hot market, the biggest fool can be a good condominium
developer... We've gone through a period in the last three
years where everybody's selling everything and anything."
In the luxury of a hot market (this study's context), a RED
firm's product development process may not be that critical. At
an acceptable price, "everything and anything" will sell.
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Overseas investors have bought entire buildings sight unseen, and
thousands of speculators have 'grabbed' units up with relatively
little product discrimination. At this time, the real estate
product is not a consumer's major focus.
In the not-too-distant future, when the market downturns (as
it inevitably does), the issue of product will suddenly become
important. Predictably, those who purchased units for investment
purposes will attempt to unload them, realizing in some instances
that their wares have serious flaws. Shoppers will not be
spending their money so freely as in halcyon days, and when they
do, they will be insist upon "product" which suits them
perfectly. They will look for design appropriateness,
construction quality, and price value, whether they buy resale
investment units or new construction. For a developer wishing to
operate in this market, having a product development methodology
in place will be a competitive advantage.
3. DEVELOPERS' PRODUCT DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES ARE PART
SCIENCE, PART ART.
Given the prior selection of a basic product type and market
location, developers' product decision-making processes operate
on a continuum bounded by "science" on one end and "art" on the
other. Scientifically, demographics are studied; artistically,
the data must be interpreted and the product development process
managed.
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4. WHILE HAVING NO PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGY AT ALL COULD
BE FATAL FOR THE DEVELOPER IN A DOWNTURN MARKET, HAVING A PROCESS
THAT IS TOO INSTITUTIONALIZED AND FORMAL COULD ALSO BE
PROBLEMATIC.
The risk of the small-scale RED firm is its inability to
implement market data; on the other hand, the risk of the large
firm may be a tendency to formalize itself into a rigid
decision-making process. Where a RED firm has institutionalized
its product development process, there is danger of such
formality destroying the spark and spontaneity of an essentially
creative endeavour. For flexibility and a built-in anticipation
of change, a looser structure paired with an emphasis on
marketing skills may fare better than an emphasis on corporate
order and method.
5. HAVING MARKET INFORMATION MAY NOT GIVE ANY COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE TO A RED FIRM. HAVING DATA IS A COMMODITY.
For a price, essentially every developer in Toronto had
access to the same market information and analyses. In a city of
three million people, it seemed that only one private consultant
prepared condominium market reports (which catalogued existing
and proposed projects and made general forecasts based on
demographic regression analysis). These reports were purchased
by a majority of local condo developers.
Since noone gained any competitive advantage by having
access to the same market data, the critical point was one's
ability to implement (make sense of) this information in the most
effective and efficient (i.e., profitable) way.
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6. THE REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT INDUSTRY NEEDS TO BECOME MORE
MARKETING-DRIVEN.
Although they talk a lot about "product", developers tend to
be project-oriented rather than product-oriented, and engage in
project development, not product development. Too often they may
shun innovation as being too risky, and look for opportunities to
copy rather than to differentiate. Some are myopic in vision,
responding only to today's market climate.
Even though the consumer/industrial product development
paradigm carries across to the condominium model with relative
ease, one notes that the development industry has resiliently
refused to accept this paradigm as its own. Real estate
stubbornly operates according to a "business" point of view.
The observation of developers clinging to a "business" paradigm
reminds one of the recent history of Chrysler Corporation.
Chrysler insisted on operating according to the rules of
"business" until it realized that people had stopped buying its
products. On the verge of corporate death, it had to adopt a
marketing-driven paradigm to ensure its survival.
The main point here is that developers do make products for
customers (to be sold or rented to them), which necessitates a
marketing-driven approach in their real estate businesses. What
is their "business" if not to develop and market their
products?
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6. A DEVELOPER SHOULD NEVER UNDERESTIMATE THE BUYING PUBLIC'S
SOPHISTICATION.
...Especially not in a(n inevitably) crummy market.
7. A DEVELOPER'S PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS MIGHT BE REMEDIED
AT WORST, OR ENHANCED AT BEST BY TAKING A MARKET-DRIVEN APPROACH
AND BUILDING ITS LEARNING BASE.
Even if a RED firm lacks a track record or substantial
resources (money, land), it can gain ground by taking a
marketing-driven approach to its products, and by building a
product development process. The best time to build one's
learning base and start moving up the learning curve is during a
good economy. A developer can hire marketing consultants for
their objectivity and cumulative experience, and 'pick their
brains'; an experienced marketing consultant might prove to be
one of the developer's best teachers. Then, in a market
downturn, the developer will have acquired internal skills and
processes in order to manage the product development process more
effectively.
"We must have the foresight to identify the long-range
issues, and the wisdom to plan for plan wisely for their
resolution. Otherwise, we will be compelled to meet
every... crisis on an ad-hoc basis, employing crash programs
and hit-and-run approaches that waste precious resources and
are only half effective." 1
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APPENDIX 'A': INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
1. Description of firm: size, organization, range of products,
existence of corporate philosophy?
2. Market identification: Why condo? What made you decide to
proceed with this product type?
3. Market analysis: What makes for a well-rounded market
analysis? How well is your firm able to meet this ideal?
4. In terms of information needed, what are the weaknesses or
limitations of market analyses? How can you overcome them?
5. Do you find that your marketing strategies are mostly
proactive or reactive? Qualitative or quantitative?
6. How/where do you get information regarding buyer behaviour
and market segment analysis?
7. How and when do you determine the building program? (What
are the sources of information? Which individuals are involved?
Who makes the final decisions?)
8. Do you do test marketing? How?
9. Who makes the product design decisions?
10. How do you think that marketing strategy differs with the
size of the organization?
11. How does the existence of competition influence your firm's
product development process?
12. Are you familiar with your competitors' product development
methods, and if so, can you compare and contrast them with your
own?
13. What's the surest and least risky aspect of the process?
14. What's the most ambiguous and vulnerable aspect of the
process?
15. How do you think the "traditional" product development
process (for consumer goods) compares with that for the
development of condominiums?
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